![]() ![]() ![]() Our findings suggest a redistribution of institutional responsibility to the individual user through three distinct social engineering storylines – “the oblivious employee”, “speaking code and social”, “fixing human flaws”. Empirically, our analysis builds on a multi-sited conference ethnography during three cyber security conferences as well as an extensive document analysis. To do so, we link work in STS on the politics of deficit construction to recent work in critical security studies (CSS) on securitization and resilience. Second, we will investigate the normative tensions that these practices create. We will first show how the rhetorical figure of the deficient user is constructed vis-à-vis notions of (in)security in social engineering discourses. In this paper, we explore how discursive framings of individual versus collective security by cyber security experts redefine roles and responsibilities at the digitalized workplace. Cyber security experts use the term “social engineering” to highlight the “human factor" in digitized systems, as social engineering attacks aim at manipulating people to reveal sensitive information. Today, social engineering techniques are the most common way of committing cybercrimes through the intrusion and infection of computer systems. ![]()
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